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Randall: Sir Edward Coke and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRLMINATION
CHARLES

H.

RANDALL, JR.*

"I would like to venture the' suggestion that the privilege against
self-incrimination is one of the great landmarks in man's struggle
to nake himself civilized."'
The period of English history beginning with the defeat of the
Spanish Armada in 1588 and ending with revolution and the execution of Charles I, in 1649, contained events which profoundly influenced the development of English and American constitutional law.
The supremacy of Parliament and the scope of the Royal prerogative,2 the jurisdiction of the common law courts and of the Chancery,
the power of the IKdng to tax without the consent of the Commons,
these were among the issues over which dispute raged. This period
generally coincided with the long career of that brilliant and irascible
lawyer and judge, Sir Edward Coke. Challenger of Kings, enemy
of Sir Francis Bacon, Coke thrust himself into the center of every
dispute.
These years were the crucial years in the development of the
privilege against self-incrimination. The history of the privilege
has been detailed in careful and scholarly articles by Dean Wigmore,
Edmund Morgan and Mary Hume Maguire. 3 Each of these writers
*Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, University of South Carolina. This article
was written in a seminar in Fundamental Human Rights under Professor Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., at the Harvard Law School, as part of work towards a master's degree in law. The
author wishes to aclmowledge a deep debt to Professor Chafee for his painstaking and
penetrating criticisms.

1. ERWIn N. GRISWOLD, THE FierH A.1ENDMENT TODAY (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1955), p. 7. United States Constitution, Amendment V,
states: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
2. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (the Steel Seizure cases),
343 U.S. 579 (1952), the brief filed by John W. Davis and others for the steel
company drew on the history of this period to argue that under the Constitution of the United States, there was no presidential prerogative power. See
argument "A", headed "The Necessary Background-the Successful Struggle
Against the Crown Prerogative and its Culmination in the Constitution of the
United States."
3. Wigmore, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, Its History, 15
HARv. L. Rv. 610 (1913); Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5
HARv. L. R v. 71 (1891) ; 8 WIGmORr, EVIDaINcE § 2250, 2251 (3d ed., 1940) ;
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calls attention to the contribution made by Coke while he was successively Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and of the
King's Bench, between 1606 and 1616.4

The development of the privilege has two over-lapping phases.
In the first phase, the common lawyers were allied to the Puritans
and Parliament in opposing the use of the oath ex officio by the
ecclesiastical courts, and especially the Court of High Commission.
These courts were actively engaged in enforcing the Reformation,
except during the brief reign of Queen Mary. They were seeking
out and prosecuting as heresy any deviation from the prescribed
religious faith. A major instrument used by these courts was the
oath x officio. A person suspected of heresy would be apprehended and asked to swear to answer truly all questions put to him, and
then would be asked questions concerning his beliefs. If he were
careless or false in his answers, the court would punish him for
heresy or for perjury.
Coke led the common lawyers in establishing that this procedure
was illegal under the Law of the Land. As Chief Justice, he successfully asserted the power of the common law courts to issue writs
of prohibition against the ecclesiastical courts, where the oath method was attempted by the latter.
This first phase of the history of the privilege is the subject of
this paper. The second phase was the extension of the rationale of
the decisions of Coke to proceedings in the common law courts themselves, and the development of the privilege in its present form.
This development commenced with John Lilburn's case,5 and the
abolition of the Star Chamber 6 and the Court of High Commission 7
in 1641. These events took place some time after Coke's death,
but his statements of the law of England, in his decisions, his Reports and his great treatise, the Institutes, played an important role
in bringing these events to pass.
The significance of the decisions of Coke went beyond the question of the legality of the use of the oath ex officio by the ecclesiasMorgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949);
Maguire, Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio As Adintinstercd in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, in EssAYs IN HISTORY AND
POLITICAL THEORY IN HONOR OF CHARLES HOWARD McILwAIN, 199 (Cambridge, Mass., 1936).

4. Wigmore, id., 15 HARv. L. Rrv., 621, 622; Morgan, id., 7; Maguire, id.,
221 ff.
5. 3 How. State Trials 1315 (1637).
6. 6 Charles I, cap. 10; 7 Statutes at Large 338 (Pickering ed., Cambridge,
1762); PLUCKNrTT, A CoNcrsn HISTORY Or THE ComMoN LAW, 173, 406, 439-441

(2d ed., Rochester, N. Y., 1936).

7. 6 Charles I, cap. 11; 7 Statutes at Large 343; Plucknett, id., 173.
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tical courts. It concerned the extent to which torture could be used
as a method of securing proof in criminal proceedings, and the extent
to which the English criminal law would be influenced by the inquisitional methods as developed in the canon law on the continent
of Europe, and as early received in the secular law of those countries.8
The study of the development of our legal system is rewarding
for its own sake. But the privilege against self-incrimination is a
constitutional doctrine that can be understood only in the light cast
by history. 9 As Chief Justice Warren said in 1955:10
"The privilege against self-incrimination is a right that was
hard-earned by our forefathers. The reasons for its inclusion
in the Constitution -and the necessities for its preservation are to be found in the lessons of history."
As in the days of Coke, so today, the privilege is no arid doctrine of
interest only to lawyers; our newspapers daily tell us of new contexts
in which this old problem arises. A study of its origins, of the situations it was designed to meet, of the arguments of its proponents,
cannot but give us greater perspective and insight in dealing with
these present problems.
In order to lend perspective and greater meaning to the problems
faced by the common law courts in dealing with the privilege after
1606, it is necessary to consider the privilege in a wider historical
context -that of the use of torture in judicial proceedings. Therefore, the first part of this paper deals with the development of the
8. A. Lawrence Lowell, The Judicial Use of Torture, 11 HARV. L.
220,223 (1897).
9. McCoRmicK,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

REV.

(St. Paul, Minn.,

1954), 252-257.

10. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 160, 161, citing GRISWOLD, supra, n. 1.
The Quinn case was the first square holding that the privilege was a limitation on the Congressional power of investigation, although the holding had
been clearly foreshadowed. See Note, Applicability of Privilege Against SelfIncrimination to Legislative Investigations, 49 COL. L. Rtv. 87 (1949).
History completely supports this view. As the materials herein show, the privilege
against self-incrimination was born and bred in the political briar-patch.
The Chief Justice continues in the Quinn quotation above, "As early as 1650,
remembrance of the horror of Star Chamber proceedings a decade before had
firmly established the privilege in the common law of England." As shown
in this paper, the proceedings in the Court of High Commission were as responsible as those in the Star Chamber for the English attitude toward compulsory self-incrimination. These were separate courts, contrary to the statement in GViswVoLD, supra, n. 1, p. 4. The Star Chamber consisted of the Privy
Council, the common-law judges, and at fimes peers of parliament. It dealt
in the main with secular criminal matters. The High Commission was composed of both ecclesiastics and laymen, and dealt with ecclesiastical offenses,
especially heresy. Because heresy and sedition tended to overlap, and because
both bodies used the oath ex officio procedure, the two courts earned the
common opprobrium of employing "Star Chamber" methods of procedure.
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inquisitional method of trial on the continent of Europe, and the introduction of this method into the English ecclesiastical courts.
1. History of the oath ex officio in English ecclesiastical courts, to
1606.
In the early 1200's, Pope Innocent III introduced several reforms
into the canon law, which prevailed throughout western Christendom.'1 In 1215, trial by ordeal was abolished. 12 Since trial by
battle was no longer permitted' 3 and trial by compurgation oaths
"was already becoming little better than a farce", 14 a new method
of trial was needed, based upon a more rational theory of proof.
This method was provided by Innocent in the inquisitional method
of proof. As Wigmore points out, this method, based on careful
questioning of the accused, was far more rational than the methods
it replaced, which had relied mainly on the intercession of the Diety.
In trial by ordeal or by battle, it had been believed that God would
bring victory to the just side; and in trial by compurgation oath,
or "the daring and succeeding to pronounce a formula of innocence,
usually in company with oath-helpers", 15 the theory was that instant
punishment would fall on one who swore falsely.
As it eventually developed, the inquisitional method of trial might
be commenced in any of three ways :16 (1) by an official complaint;
(2) by an accusing witness, or per fanmam vicinae or per clamosam insinuationen, by common report, or general rumor in the neighborhood; or, (3) by the judge ex officio mero, merely by nature of his
office. The canon law authorities were not clear as to whether a
proceeding could commence ex officio mero without the accusing
witness or per famam safeguards.' 7 It was arguable that the ex
officio method was legal or illegal depending on the presence or
absence of common report concerning the defendant. However, the
argument in the common law courts later came to concern not this
matter of the legality of the method of presentment, but the legality
of the oath procedure itself, in ecclesiastical courts in England.' 8
When summoned ex officio, the accused was brought before the
judge, where he was forced to swear under oath to answer truly all
11. Wigmore, supra note 3, 614.
12. Ibid.
13. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THz HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAW, at 647 (Cambridge, Mass., 1895).
14. Wigmore, supranote 3, 615.
15. Ibid.
16. Id., 616. The three methods were respectively called Accusatio, Denunciato and Inquisitlo.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
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questions put to him. 19 He was interrogated in detail concerning
the accusation or the suspicions of the court, and his replies were
carefully taken down. He had, of course, no opportunity to examine the charges before the interrogation or to have the aid of
counsel.
At the same time that this inquisitional method of trial was being
introduced and developed on the continent, the new method of trial
by jury was replacing the same outworn methods of trial in the common law courts in England, 20 that is, trial by battle, trial by ordeal,
and trial by compurgation oaths. The inquisitional method soon
was introduced into the secular law on the continent. 2 ' The English
common law alone in the Western world failed to adopt it. The
new jury trial was hardy enough in its resistance to the civil law ideas
so that the banished Chief Justice of England, Sir John Fortescue,
could contrast it with the inquisitional method on the continent,
and cite as a great advantage of the common law its being less reliant on the use of torture.22 For the inquisitional method and the
civil law proceeded to formulate "an elaborate calculus of proof,
assisted by admissions extracted by torture, and witnesses examined
in secret." 28

The civil law developed this method from the Roman

law, and from Innocent III's inquisitional technique, and in its later
stages the equation of the judicial process was described thus by
Beccaria :24

"... the force of the muscles and the sensibility of the nerves
of an innocent person being given, it is required to find the
degree of pain necessary to make him confess himself guilty
of a given crime."
Holdsworth 25 and Lowell 26 agree that the inquisitional method
and the elaborate theory of proof developed by the civil law and
the succeeding codes on the continent, as contrasted with the English
19. Ibid.
20. I HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 139 ff.

(Boston, 1927).

21. Lowell, supra note 8, at 223. Lowell felt that the law of France at the

time he wrote (1897) was "in substance the old inquisitional process with the
torture left out, and a jury somewhat inharmoniously tacked on." For a description of the legal procedure, see Lowell at 226, 227; for a narrative description of the technique, without the use of torture, see HoNoRn DE BALZAC,
LUCIEN Dn RUBSMBRE,

ch. XV, and THE LAST INCARNATION

OF VAUTRIN,

ch. II, both quoted in WIGmORe, THE ScIENCE or JUDICIAL PROOF, 541 ff.
22. SIR JOHN FORTrESCU,

IN PRAISE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

[DE LAUDI-

Bus ANGLIA4]; cited in Coke, II Inst., 35.
23. I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 20, at 146.
24. Id., at 146, note 7, quoting Beccaria.

25. Id., at 167, 168.
26. Lowell, op. cit. supra note 8, 224-225.
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this large role played by the extraction of confessions in the continental criminal law. As Lowell puts it:
"The new inquisitional procedure, which was thoroughly in
harmony with the spirit of Roman jurisprudence, was gradually adopted by the continental states, until at last prosecutions for
crime were carried on almost exclusively by the judicial officers
of the government; and of course they were conducted with
greater and greater secrecy. Under these 'circumstances it is
not unnatural that torture should have been used. A man who
was both judge and prosecutor, and who felt almost certain of
a prisoner's guilt, but could not quite prove it, was strongly
tempted to fortify his opinion by forcing a confession . . . Sir

James Stephen tells us that during the preparation of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure in 1872 some discussion took
place about the reasons which occasionally led native police
officers to torture prisoners, when an experienced civil service
officer observed, 'There is a great deal of laziness in it. It is
far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting
up evidence.' . . . But the thing that made the rack a regular

systematic part of criminal procedure, instead of an exceptional
resource, was the 'theory of proof.'
*.. Except in rare cases where the crime had been committed
in the presence of two witnesses, and the still rarer ones of
proof by documents or conclusive presumptions, the prisoner
was stretched upon the rack; and in fact the chief effect of the
doctrine of indications was to permit the use of torture."
This development of the inquisitional method on the continent, and
the likelihood that it would have been paralleled in England if it
had not been successfully resisted by the common lawyers, should
be kept in mind as an important backdrop to the technical disputes
about the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts in England.2 7 The
effect of this method on the criminal law of the continent was a lasting one. Only the vigor of the common lawyers prevented its having
a permanent effect upon the law of England.
When the French wife of Henry II came over to England in 1236,
several churchmen came over with her.2 8 Her uncle, Boniface, was
27. Section 4 of this paper is largely concerned with such jurisdictional disputes.
28. Wigmore, supra note 3, at 616 to 618.
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made archbishop of Canterbury, and a Cardinal Otho also came over
in 1236. These men became active in developing the church law,
in England. A constitution promulgated by Cardinal Otho at a
Pan-Anglican council in London in 1236, and a similar constitution
from Boniface in 1272, brought the English ecclesiastical courts into
29
line with the new canon law procedure on the continent.
Wigmore finds that the struggle that then ensued between the King
and his courts and the ecclesiastics concerned only the jurisdiction
of the ecclesiastical courts, 30 but the materials brought to bear on
this problem by Maguire s l and Morgan 2 are persuasive that from
the beginning there was strong objection in England to the oath
procedure itself. Thus when Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln,
in 1246 used the inquisitional methods to investigate the morals of
both ecclesiastics and laymen, 8 the King issued a writ of prohibition,
and when it was disregarded, he issued a writ of attachment for contempt. 34 Arguments were raised against the oath procedure which
some four centuries later were to prove decisive. It was insisted that
the procedure was contrary to the custom of the land, that it produced "intolerable vexations tending to defamation and schism, which
involved men in danger of perjury by forcing them to answer on
oath in regard to the secret private actions and opinions of others,
wherein they might easily be mistaken."8 5
In 1285, by the statute Circumspecte Agatis,8 6 it was enacted that
the King's writ of prohibition 37 did not lie in matters spiritual, and
several questions concerning the boundaries of jurisdiction between
the ecclesiastical and lay courts were answered in favor of the former.
But again in 1315-16, the clergy were objecting, and they presented
certain Articuli CleriM to the King, asking for further restraints on
the exercise of the writ of prohibition, by alleging that the lay courts
were encroaching upon ecclesiastical matters. The statute Articuli
Cleri recognized these claims, and set forth situations wherein the
lay courts could not interfere by prohibition. However, at an uncertain date before the end of the reign of Edward II, the statute
Prohibitioformata de Statuto Articuli Cleri, addressed to the ecclesi29. Ibid.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id., at 612, 615, note 3.
Maguire, supra note 3, at 204 ff.
Morgan, supranote 3, at 1-9.
Maguire, supra note 3, at 205.

34. Id., at 206.
35. Ibid.
36. 13 Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1285) ; I Statutes at Large 242.
37. Discussed at pages 437-8 herein.
38. 9 Edw. II, Stat. I (1315-16); I Statutes at Large 338; 2 Inst. 601.
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of the ecclesiastical courts.
This ProhibitioFormatais called by Wigmore the Articuli Cleri,39
which might cause some confusion. The Articuli Cleri of 1316 was
solely concerned with the respective jurisdictions of the lay and ecclesiastical courts. The Prohibitio formed on that statute has a reference to the use of the oath procedure, but is also mainly concerned
with the respective jurisdictional claims of the two courts. The
Prohibitio is fairly short. After a few sentences noting that the
ecclesiastical courts have been taking jurisdiction of certain causes,
and prohibiting them from further cognizance of such pleas, it contains the sentence:
"Et quod non permittant quod aliqui laici in balliva sua in
aliquibus locis conveniant, ad aliquos recognitiones per sacramenta sua facienda, nisi in causis matrimonialibus et testamentariis."
The Statutes of the Realm translates this as follows

:40

"And they suffer not that any layman within their baliwick,
come together in any places to make any such recognitions by
their oaths, except in causes of matrimony and testamentary."
Wigmore reads these two statutes as conceding fully to the ecclesiastical courts their own methods of procedure, i. e., by ex officio oath
if they wished, where they had jurisdiction. Both Morgan and Maguire read them as giving permission to so proceed only in matrimonial and testamentary causes, 4 1 although they had jurisdiction
in other causes and could there proceed without the oath method.
The latter construction is the one that finally prevailed. The meaning of this language in the Prohibitio became of importance later
when the ex officio method was used to question laymen in actions
of heresy.
It can be readily seen that the ex officio method, while not so objectionable when confined to the traditionally canonical concerns of
matrimonial and testamentary matters, wherein issues were fairly
narrowly defined and relatively private matters were involved, was
capable of gross abuse when applied to heresy or political proceed39. Wigmore, supra note 1, at 618.

The Prohibitio Forinata is a statute of

uncertain date towards the end of the reign of Edward II, and is found at

I Statutes at Large, 403, in Latin. No translation is given. It is also given

in Latin in 2 Inst. 600.
40. Morgan, supra note 3, at 4.

41. Wignore, supra note 3, at 618; Morgan, supra note 3, at 3, 4; Maguire,

supra note 3, at 206-7.
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ings. Here were questions of great public concern, on which passionate doctrinaire beliefs were held.
During the rise of Lollardry, the ecclesiastical forces were able
to induce the enactment of the famous statute de Haeretico Comburendo.42 In addition to its provision authorizing the King's writ
to issue to permit the burning of a heretic, this statute forbade heretical preaching and by implication authorized the use of the ex officio
procedure to question suspected heretical preachers. Such preachers
could be arrested and detained in prison until they purged themselves
according to the laws of the church, or the diocesan could:
".. . openly and judicially proceed against such persons so
arrested, .

.

. and determine that same business according to

the canonical decrees within three months after the said arrest,
any lawful impediment ceasing."
Hence this statute in permitting procedure "according to the canonical decrees" was construed to permit the ex officio procedure, the
last four words quoted removing the restraint of the clause in the
statute Prohibitio formnata which restricted the oath procedure to
causes matrimonial and testamentary.
Another statute in 1414 provided for turning over to the ecclesiastical courts persons indicted for heresy. 43 Thus the common law
courts became active partners with the ecclesiastical courts in prosecuting heresy. These statutes remained law long after Lollardry
had subsided, and they seem to have received vigourous enforcement
by ex officio proceedings in the church courts. 44 However, in 1533
the requirements for a presentment were considerably increased.
Wigmore 45 finds this statute46 to be "the rift within the lute", the
first time that the common lawyers or Parliament attempted not
merely to restrict the jurisdiction, but to dictate the methods of procedure of the ecclesiastical courts, even where they admittedly had
jurisdiction. The statute provided that:
". .. every person or persons being presented or indicted of
[heresy] or duly accused or detected thereof by two lawful
witnesses at the least to any Ordinaries of this Realm having
power to examine heresies, shall and may after every such accusation or presentment and none otherwise nor by any other
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

2 Hen. IV, cap. 15 (1401) ; 2 Statutes at Large 415.
2 Hen. V, cap. 7 (1414) ; 3 Statutes at Large 22.
Morgan, subra note 3, at 6; Wigmore, supra note 3, at 618.
Wigmore, id. at 618.
25 Hen. VIII, cap. 14 (1533) ; 4 Statutes at Large 278.
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means be cited convented arrested taken or apprehended by
any of the said Ordinaries or any other the King's ministers
and subjects who so ever."
The accused was then permitted to answer in open court to the presentment. Similarly in 1539 a statute47 abolishing "diversity in
opinions" provided procedural safeguards for the accused. However in 1554 under Mary, these statutes were repealed, 48 and the
harsh statutes of Henry IV were expressly revived.
These were the significant statutory materials when Elizabeth
came to the throne in 1558, and by the Act of Supremacy 49 and the
Act of Uniformity of Common Prayer5o sought to firmly establish
the national church. The Act of Supremacy began by asserting that
all the ancient jurisdiction heretofore usurped by foreign powers
was restored to the Crown. The Crown would have all spiritual
jurisdiction, including the correction of "all manner or errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offences, contempts, and enormities." 51 The
statute further provided: 52
"And that your Highness . . . shall have full power and au-

thority by virtue of this act, by letters patents under the great
seal of England, to assign, name and authorize . . . such person or persons . . . as your Majesty . . . shall think meet, to
exercise, use, occupy and execute under your Highness, . . . all

manner of jurisdictions, privileges and preeminences, in any
wise touching or concerning any spiritual or ecclesiastical jurisdiction . . . and to visit, reform, redress, order, correct and

amend all such errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offenses, contempts and enormities whatsoever, which by any manner of
spiritual or ecclesiastical power, authority or jurisdiction, can
or may lawfully be reformed, .

.

. to exercise, use and execute

all the premises, according to the tenor and effect of the said
letters patents; any matter or cause to the contrary in any wise
notwithstanding."
It can be seen that this language might be interpreted by the
strong ruler of England to give her considerable discretion in issuing the letters patent which it authorized, and she did so construe
it. The early commissions which she granted raised no problems
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

31 Hen. VIII, cap. 14 (1539) ; 4 Statutes at Large 468.
1 & 2 P. & M., cap. 6 (1554); 6 Statutes at Large 32.
1 Eliz., cap. 1 (1558) ; 6 Statutes at Large 107.
1 Eliz., cap. 2 (1558) ; 6 Statutes at Large 117.
6 Statutes at Large, at 110.
Ibid.
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of the oath ex officio,53 but the letters patent issued to Coke's
friend, Archbishop Whitgift, in 1583, expressly authorized him to
employ the ex officio procedure.5 4 The Archbishop used it actively
in striking at heretics, both clergy and laymen. The Catholics who
were subjected to this mode of investigation could raise little effective support from any powerful source, but many Puritans also
were subjected to these inquisitional examinations. They reacted
strongly, and received support in Parliament. The Puritans resisted
by refusal to take the oath, which would immediately halt the proceedings; by attacking the oath in letters to the Queen, the Archbishop and the Commons; by pamphleteering and by introducing
bills in the Commons. 5 5 However, the High Commissions were not
thereby induced to slacken their ardor, and they soon began to assume a regular jurisdiction and to act like regularly constituted
courts.
The jurisdiction of the ordinary ecclesiastical courts and of the
Court of High Commission, and the development of the latter into
a permanent court holding regular sittings, is discussed below in
section 4 of this paper. Here it suffices to say that the Court of High
Commission, like other courts, began to assume the widest possible
jurisdiction. Thus a clash with the common law courts became inevitable.
2. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the Common Law
Courts, to 1606.
In Collier v. Collier,56 the Court of Common Pleas had held that

in a proceeding by a wife against her husband for incontinency, the
ecclesiastical court could not question the defendant by the oath ex
officio method, but only in cases matrimonial and testamentary. The
court seems to have classified the ecclesiastical action as one of defamation. 57 Coke argued that Nemo tenetur seipsum prodere (no
one should be required to accuse himself), and a prohibition was
granted against the ecclesiastical court. In the later important case
of Burrowes and others v. The High Commission,58 in 1616, Coke
cited three cases5 9 in which the common law courts had issued writs
of habeas corpus to the High Commission to release defendants held
53. Maguire, supra note 3, at 214.
54. Ibid.; Morgan, supra note 3, at 7; Wigmore, supra note 3, at 620. See
also STRYp'S LIVE OF WHITGIFT, App. 49.
55. WVizmore, supra note 3, at 216.
56. 4 Leon. 194; Cro. Eliz. 201; Moore 906 (1589).
57. 4 Leon. 194, quoted on page 444 herein.
58. 3 Bulstrode's Reoorts 48 (1616). See pages 450-452 herein.
59. Hinde's Case, Dyer 175b; Skrogges v. Coleshill, Dyer 175a; Leigh's
case, 18 Eliz.
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for refusal to answer questions under oath. Skrogges was held for
refusal to answer questions concerning his title to an office; Leigh
for refusal to tell whether he had been present at the saying of
masses; and Hyndes was suspected of usury. In each of these cases,
Coke says that the defendants were released because Nerno tenetur
seipsuin prodere. Hence before 1600 the common law courts were
developing the doctrine that the oath ex officio could not be used by
the ecclesiastical courts against laymen except in matters testamentary and matrimonial.
However, in cases commenced in the common law courts, as distinguished from applications to the common law courts for writs of
habeas corpus or prohibition against the ecclesiastical courts, there
is no recognition of the privilege and no application of the canon
law maxim. The early cases in Howell's State Trials, including
those cited below 60 in which Coke was prosecutor for the Crown,
indicate that the trial was a running argument between the prosecution, the defendant and the court. The accused was asked questions
which were directly incriminating, which he was required to answer.
Depositions of the accused and of witnesses were read in court, and
the accused was asked questions concerning them, and made ,comments of his own. The important differences between these trials
and those on the continent were that the common law trials were
public, and that the tribunal consisted of both court and jury. The
latter had the power to make the ultimate decision, and could bring
their own knowledge, derived outside of court, to the decision.
The use of torture in cases in the common law courts falls naturally under two headings: the use of torture to force an accused to
plead to an indictment, and its use in questioning an accused. When
a prisoner refused to plead to the indictment, and "put himself upon
6
the country", the common law did not know what to do with him. '
The strict right of the accused under the law of the land was to a
trial by one of the traditional methods: by battle, by compurgation
oath, or by ordeal. As indicated elsewhere, 62 these methods had
largely been displaced by the jury trial. But the accused could not
be tried before a jury in a case of felony, except treason, unless by
his own consent, given by his plea. As Holdsworth says, 63 it took
the common law 500 years to arrive at the obvious answer, to impanel a jury and try him whether he consented or not. The sugges60. On page 435 herein.
61. II POLLOCK & MAITLAND, ofp. cit. supra note 13, at 647.

62. At page 421 herein.
63. I HOLDSWORTH, oP. cit. supra note 20, at 154.
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tion of Coke was that the refusal of the defendant to plead be
treated as a plea of guilty, and this answer was finally given in 1772
by statute. 64 Not until 1827 was it enacted that a refusal to plead
65
would result in entry of a plea of not guilty.

Prior to these statutes, however, the common law considered itself helpless to try the accused until the plea was entered by him.
In 1275, under Edward I, it was enacted6 6 that prisoners who refused to plead be put in "prison fort et dure". At least by 140067
this had by a natural progression become "peine fort et dure", under
which rule torture was used to force a plea. The prisoner was often
staked down in the open, fed bread and water on alternate days
and had weights piled upon him until he consented to plead. Since
if he were found guilty of felony, all his goods were forfeited to the
Crown, and if he died before he pleaded his next-of-kin would get
them, a prisoner had a motive for refusing to plead.
It is shown elsewhere 68 that torture was commonly used in questioning prisoners held on charges of treason. Otherwise, however,
the use of torture in questioning a prisoner who had pleaded to an
indictment was recognized as being against the law of the land.
However torture might be used, it had no sanction in the law.
Despite statements by Sir John Fortescue and others that the
use of torture was contrary to the law of the land, the conclusion is
justified that before Coke's tenure on the bench there was no recognition of the principle that a party need not answer directly incriminating questions. The application of the ecclesiastical law maxim Nenmo,
tenetur seipsum prodere to common law courts had not even beeni
anticipated in the decisions in those courts.
3. Career of Coke to his appointment as Chief Judge of the Court
of Common Pleas, in1606.
Further to set the stage, it is necessary to review briefly the life
of Sir Edward Coke, until he was appointed to the bench. Coke's
life fairly coincided with an important period in the history of the
privilege against self-incrimination. He was born in about 1552,
some six years before the commencement of the reign of Queen
Elizabeth. In the first year of Elizabeth's reign, the Act of Supremacy was passed, with important consequences for the privilege
as indicated below. 69

Coke died in 1634, some three years before

64. 12 GEo. III, cap. 20 (1772) ; 29 Statutes at Large, II, 29.
65. 7 & 8 Geo. IV, cap. 28 (1827) ; 67 Statutes at Large 165.
66. 3 Edw. I, cap. 12 (1275) ;I Statutes at Large 83.
67. I HOLDSWORTH, ofb. cit. supra note 20, at 154.
68. On page 435 herein.
69. On pages 439, 443, 447 herein.
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the events which culminated in John Lilburn's trial, 70 in which Lilburn asserted the privilege and was ultimately upheld.
The biographers of Coke 71 present a picture of a man inordinately ambitious, even avaricious, invariably successful in attaining his
goal, a painstaking scholar and prodigious worker, a cunning courtier
in an age when that was the best road to advancement, and a stalwart and courageous champion of the law of England. He is a
man to whom we can give unbounded admiration for his scholarly
:and professional attainments, to whom we can acknowledge a great
debt for his contributions to English law, but in whom we can find
little to love. This picture necessarily results because the only well
documented episodes of his life concern his professional activities,
his clashes with the today more popular Sir Francis Bacon, his constant domestic difficulties with his second wife; while in his defense
are presented only his vigorous support of the common law against
other courts and other legal disciplines, his important services in the
House of Commons from 1621 on, including his role in winning
from the King the Petition of Right, his Reports and his Institutes.
These are all great professional achievements but none soften the
portrait of the man. There are suggestions of domestic happiness
in his marriage with his first wife, by whom he had ten children,
but the details of his married life or of any close friendships he
might have had are lacking. Similarly, he seems to have taken no
interest in the great cultural accomplishments of Elizabethan England - no man has ever accused Sir Edward of having written the
plays of Shakespeare, and it may well be that he had never seen one. 72
Edward Coke was born of a fine family in Norfolk, his father,
Robert Coke, being a barrister of Lincoln's Inn, who after rose to
the rank of Bencher.7 3 The name Coke has been said to signify a
river among the ancient Britons, 74 or to have derived from the
British word "Coc", a chief ;75 but Campbell prefers to consider that
it is an effort to disguise the spelling of Cook, representing the oc70. 3 Howell's State Trials, 1315 (1637).
71. 5 HOLDSWORTu, HISTORY OF EmrLsIr LAW contains a readable and care'fully documented biography; 1 CAMPBELL, Livzs OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES (Lon,don, 1849), is also very good, and draws much on contemporary sources; LYON
& BLOCK, EDWARD COE,OaACLE OF THE LAW (Boston and New York, 1929),
is a somewhat fictional biography, developing the background of life in Coke's
time; WOOLRYcH, LIFE OF CoKE (London, 1826) is the earliest I found, but
not helpful; JoHcsoN, LIFE OF SIR EDwAI COKE (London, 1837) is not carefully documented, but is interesting and useful.
72. I CAMPBELL, LIvEs OF THE CHIEF JusTicES, 243 (London, 1849).
73. WOOLEYCH, LIrg oF COKE, 10 (London, 1826).

74. Id., at 7.

75. CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 72, at 240.
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cupation of the founder of the family at the time when surnames
were adopted in England.7 6 And Lady Hatton, Coke's second wife,
seems to have shared this view, for she never took her husband's
name, and always spelt and pronounced it "Cook". At any rate,
the family were established gentry at the time of the birth of Edward,
for it held prosperous lands in Norfolk, and only families of the
gentry could afford the long and expensive education required to
77
train a son for the bar.

In 1560, Coke was entered at the Free Public School in Norwich,
where he was thoroughly grounded in Latin, and where he no doubt
learned some of the habits of steady toil that after served him so
well; for the ordinance of a similar school provided at the time
that :78
...the scholars shall resort to the School at six in the morning and continue there until eleven, and at one in the afternoon
and continue until five.
In October, 1567, Coke went to Trinity College in Cambridge,
79
It
where he probably studied Latin, Greek, logic and philosophy.
is extremely unlikely that he studied any law at Cambridge, however. The Reformation had ended the study of the canon law there,
but the civil law was still taught, as a preparation for the diplomatic
service, or for practice in the Admiralty, the ecclesiastical courts,
the Court of Requests, or in Chancery."0 However, the civil law
was studied only by students past the degree of Bachelor, and upoh
acquiring that degree Coke left the University.
Coke left Cambridge in 1571 to enter Clifford's Inn, an Inn of
Chancery, 8 ' and commence his legal studies. In April, 1572, he wab
admitted to the Middle Temple, an Inn of Court. His daily schedule
was indeed a rigorous one, if Campbell is accurate :82
• . . Every morning he rose at three,- in the winter season
lighting his own fire. He read Bracton, Littleton, the Year
Books, and the folio Abridgments of the Law, till the courts
met at eight. He then went by water to Westminster, and heard
cases argued till twelve, when pleas ceased for dinner. After
76. Id., note at 240.

77. Ibid.
78. LYoN & BLOCK, EDNWARD COKE, ORACLM OV
N. Y., 1929).
79. Id., at 20.

TH

LAW,

13 (Boston &

80. Id., at 21.

81. CAmPBm-L, op. cit. supra note 72, at 241, 242.
82. Id., at 242, 243.
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a short repast in the Inner Temple Hall, he attended 'readings'
or lectures in the afternoon, and then resumed his private studies
till five, or supper-time. This meal being ended, the moots
took place, when difficult questions of law were proposed and
discussed,- if the weather was fine, in the garden by the river
side; if it rained, in the covered walks near the Temple Church.
Finally, he shut himself up in his chamber, and worked at his
common-place book, in which he inserted, under the proper
heads, all the legal information he had collected during the day.
When nine o'clock struck, he retired to bed, that he might have
an equal portion of sleep before and after midnight.
This schedule of rising at three and retiring at nine he seems to
have kept throughout his life.
The only anecdote of Coke's years of preparation for the bar
concerns as usual a professional matter; he prepared and argued
before the Benchers of the Inner Temple on behalf of the students
a representation that their cook had failed in his duties to provide
adequate food and had broken his contract, his argument in this matter evoking much admiration.83
In Easter Term of 1578, Coke was called to the bar, and again
our information about his life concerns accomplishments in his
profession. He earned much admiration in his manner of winning
his first case, the Lord Cromwell's case,8 4 in 1579. The Lord
Cromwell had brought down from London to preach in Norfolk two
preachers who taught that the Book of Common Prayer was impious
and superstitious. The Vicar of the local church remonstrated with
the Lord, who said to him, "Thou art a base varlet, and I like not of
thee." To this the Vicar made bold reply: "It is no marvel that
thou likest not of me if you like of men that maintain sedition against
the Queen's proceedings." In an action for slander of a peer of the
realm, Coke on behalf of the Vicar noted a defect in plaintiff's pleading, but reserved objection until a verdict had been given for the
Lord. Coke then moved in arrest of judgment, citing several inaccuracies in the declaration's recital of the statute De Scandalia Magvatum, upon which the action was founded, and the defendant prevailed. This incident is illustrative of Coke's lifelong love for and mastery of the niceties and technicalities of common law jurisprudence.
Coke was in the next year one of the counsel in Shelley's Case,85
and made the principal arguments for the winning side in that fa83. Id., at 243.
84. Id., at 243, 244; 4 Co. Rep. 12b.
85. 1 Co. Rep. 93b (1581) ; CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 71, at 244.
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mous case.86 It is perhaps significant that the anecdotes which
remain of Coke concern such technical accomplishments, for this
ability was to stand him and the common law in good stead in resisting the ex officio procedure.
At any rate he prospered, both his marriage and his career adding to his carefully husbanded inheritance, and soon he was a very
wealthy man. His gain in honors paralleled his increasing wealth.
In 1590 he was chosen a Bencher of the Inner Temple.87 In 1592
he became a Reader for the Inn. In the same year he was appointed
Recorder for the City of London,8 8 and Elizabeth chose him to be
the Queen's Solicitor General. The following year, Coke was returned to Parliament from a district in Norfolk, the same year in
which Francis Bacon was first returned from Middlesex. Their
famous rivalry commenced soon after, for when in 1594 the position
of Attorney General became vacant, Bacon, through his patron the
Earl of Essex, exerted every wile to obtain it.89 In the end, his
youth and inexperience in the law prevented his succeeding, and
Mr. Solicitor was appointed. Coke's professional standing and brilliant record at this time made the choice wholly proper. But whether
motivated by pique at the presumptions of the young philosopher to
aspire to the higher post or by jealousy of the thought of having so
brilliant an adversary high in the Queen's service, Coke then successfully opposed the appointment of Bacon to the vacant Solicitorship.9 0 Coke remained Attorney General until June, 1606, when
James I, who had succeeded to the throne on Elizabeth's death in
1603, appointed him Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas.
During these eventful years Coke had several experiences of interest to our history. In 1589, he successfully argued in the Common Bench in Collier v. Collier,91 discussed at greater length below,
for a prohibition against the ecclesiastical court which had attempted
to examine the plaintiff upon his oath. The plaintiff had been sued,
apparently in a court of an Ordinary (the reports say only "spiritual
court") for incontinency, and Coke argued that Nemo tenetur seipsum prodere in such cases, that is, no one can be forced to betray
himself, except in causes matrimonial or testamentary.
In 1593, when Coke became a member of Parliament for the first
time, he was made Speaker of the Commons in spite of his inex86. CAMPBELL, Ibid.
87. Id., at 246.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Ibid.
Id., at 250, 251.
Ibid.
4 Leon. 194; Cro. Eliz. 201; Moore 906 (1589).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

17

QUARThYPVLY
CAROLINA
SOUTHSouth
CarolinaLAW
Law Review,
Vol. 8, Iss. 4 [2020],
[Vol. Art.
8 2

perience as a legislator. He had immediate occasion as Speaker
to support the Queen and her ecclesiastical courts in the fight over
the administering of the oath ex officio by such courts. After Coke
made the traditional address of self-deprecation to the Queen in
accepting the post of Speaker,9 2 a member by the name of Morrice, an Attorney of the Court of Wards, moved the House touching
the use by ecclesiastical judges of the Inquisition procedure, contrary
to the laws of the Realm. He offered two'bills, one concerning the
"compelling [of subjects] upon their own oaths to accuse themselves
in their own private actions, words and thoughts . . .",,

the other

concerning the imprisoning of subjects who refused to take the oath.
He asked that the one concerning imprisonment be read, and that
the other be read at a convenient time in the future. After argument on the bills, Coke as Speaker stalled further consideration,
by requesting time to study them, since they contained matter of
great weight, and were not easily understood. He promised the
Commons :4
• . . Wherefore if it would please you to give me leave to consider of it, I protest I will be faithful and keep it with all Secrecy.
The next day, Coke explained to the Commons that he had been
summoned to the court in the afternoon after he had taken the bills,
and that he had a message from the Queen to deliver to the House.
He assured them that he had kept the bills with all secrecy, but
upon being asked by the Queen he had had to disclose the subjects
which they concerned. The Queen's message showed strong disapproval of any interference by the Parliament with her church.
She had told Coke :95
, , * It was not meant that we should meddle with matters
of State and Causes Ecclesiastical . . . [Her] express Com-

mandment is, that no Bill touching the said matters of State
or reformation in Causes Ecclesiastical be exhibited.
The Queen threatened to dissolve the session of Parliament unless
the matter was dropped.
That apparently ended discussion of Morrice's bills. Undoubtedly the action taken by Mr. Speaker in disclosing the contents of
92. SIR SuioNs
don, 1682).

D'EWEs, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, at 45 (Lon-

93. Id., at 474.
94. Id., at 476.
95. Id., at 479.
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the bills and in halting their discussion was prudent. The imperious
Elizabeth would deal harshly with any difference of opinion on
church matters. Some two decades later, under a weaker and less able
monarch, Coke would accept in a judicial capacity a role as leader
in the opposition to the oath ex officio which he here rejected as a
legislator.
Again, as Attorney General for the Crown, Coke came in contact with the use of torture as a means of enforcing confessions.
It was his duty to question in the Tower of London prisoners held
on charges of treason, and torture was customarily used to elicit
cooperation from these unhappy souls. It appears that he was not
remiss in this duty,9 6 although later, in his Third Institute, he stated
flatly that torture was contrary to the law of England, citing Sir
John Fortescue. 97 The seeming inconsistency is said by Campbell
to be due to Coke's view that such procedure was lawful or permissible for the Crown in cases of treason, 98 but the language in the
99
Institute is not consistent with this view.
As Attorney General, Coke conducted in a: particularly brutal
manner the prosecutions for treason of such famous defendants as
the Earl of Essex,' 0 0 Sir Walter Raleigh, 01 Guy Fawkes 0 2 and
Charles Garnet,' 0 3 the latter pair in connection with the "Gunpowder
Plot". He also seems to have sat many times in the Star Chamber,
where the oath procedure was often used. Coke refused to sit on
04
the Court of High Commission.'
In 1598, Coke married for the second time and thereby incurred
the wrath of Archbishop Whitgrift, who at this time was actively
engaged under the commission issued to him in 1583 in investigating the religious regularity of the Queen's subjects. Whitgrift had
just "thundered . . . an anathema against irregular marriages" when
Coke, at his bride's insistence, was married in violation of three marriage laws of the church. He was married outside of a church, he
had no marriage license, and he did not publish the banns before
his marriage.' 0 5 An immediate libel issued against Coke, his fatherin-law who arranged the marriage, and the priest who performed
96.

CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 72,

97. III Inst. 34, 35.

at 251, 252.

98. CAMPBELL, op. cit. mpra note 72, at 252.

99. III Inst., especially at 35.

100. I How. S.T. 1333 (1600).

101. 2 How. S.T. 1 (1603).
102. 2 How. S.T. 159 (1606).

103. 2 How. S.T. 217 (1606).

104. CAMPBELL, op. cit. mpra note 72, at 270.
105. Id., at 253 to 257. Campbell tells of the negotiations and intrigues leading to this unfortunate marriage of convenience.
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the ceremony. Coke was spared only by his making a humble submission, his dispensation stating as his excuse his "ignorance of the
ecclesiastical law". Undoubtedly this language of the dispensation
to the foremost lawyer of his time evoked many a chuckle in the
coffee-shops of London.
On May 23, 1603, the recently crowned James I knighted his
Attorney General, and on June 30, 1606, he resigned from the lucrative and politically powerful post he held and became Chief Justice
of the Court of Common Pleas. From that date until his death
the career of Coke is an inspiration to the legal profession. His
career on the bench displayed a knowledge of the law that has never
been surpassed, and judicial statesmanship of the highest order. His
removal from the bench, which seemed at the time to end his active
participation in the legal affairs of his day, only gave opportunity
for greater honors in his contribution to the winning of the Petition
of Right.
4. Coke's Attack on the Oath ex officio, as Employed by the Court
of High Commission.
Coke could hardly have chosen a more propitious hour to be
raised to the bench. Many crucial questions were pressing for decision: the relationship of the common law courts to the ecclesiastical courts; the validity of the writs of prohibition issued to the latter
by the former; the nature and jurisdiction of the High Commission;
the use of the ex officio procedure by that body; and the scope and
extent of the King's prerogative. Coke dealt successively with
these problems under the unifying concept of a great principlethe supremacy of the law of England.
According to this principle, the common law courts were supreme
in determining from acts of Parliament and from the customs of
the realm, as found in common law decisions, what the law of England was. The jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was subject
to determination by the courts of common law. The High Commission was authorized only by statute, the Act of Supremacy, and was
limited by that act, as construed by common law courts. Writs of
prohibition could issue to review the legality of the jurisdictional
claims or the methods of procedure of an ecclesiastical court, High
Commission or other. The King's prerogative was limited; the King
himself was subject to the law of the land. For a while, Coke thought
even that acts of Parliament could be reviewed by the judicial power,
and if found contrary to the law of the land, could be held void.' 0 6
106. Dr. Bonham's case, 8 Co. Rep. 114.

See Plucknett, Bonham's Case

and Judicial Review, 40 HmAv. L. Rzv. 30 (1926).
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Coke gave these views as decisions in the Court of Common Pleas
and the King's Bench, in his Reports and his Institutes, and in his
arguments in the Commons. These views had a powerful immediate effect, coming from the most forceful and most learned lawyer
of the age. Although they did not prevail at once, eventually most
of them did prevail.
When Sir Edward Coke came to the bench, the common law courts
had well-established precedents for keeping the ecclesiastical courts
within their proper jurisdiction. Writs of Praemunire or of Prohibition were the instruments for that purpose. The writ of Praemunire could be issued on the application of the Crown or of a
private suitor.107 It was founded upon an ancient statute 0 8 and
was in the nature of a criminal proceeding against any person who
commenced in a papal court litigation that properly belonged to the
King's courts. After the Reformation, the remedy was applied
by the common law courts to suitors in the King's ecclesiastical
courts.10 9 The proceeding was called an Attaint,11 0 and was brought
against the individual who had commenced in another court litigation which properly belonged to the King's courts."'
Coke believed that the statutes of Praemunire applied not only to suitors in
the King's ecclesiastical courts, but also to suitors in chancery112 or
the admiralty." 3 The serious nature of the offense was indicated
by the punishment which was prescribed. The judgment would put
the defendant out of the King's protection, that is, deny to him
thenceforth the ability to bring any proceedings in the King's courts
of common law." 4 He might also be imprisoned, and his goods forfeited to the Crown." 5 Coke cites cases after the Reformation
in which the writ was issued against suitors in the ecclesiastical
courts.

I 16

The more usual method, however, was by writ of Prohibition
issued to the ecclesiastical court itself. A defendant in an ecclesiastical court could apply to a common-law court for the writ.1 17 The
writ was issued by the common law judge to the ecclesiastical court,
107. Co. Litt. 120a, § 199; Of Praemunire, at 124, III Inst.

108. 27 Edw. III, cap. 1 (1353) ; 2 Statutes at Large 72.
109. Co. Litt., 120, 121.

110. Id., at 121.
111. Ibid.

112. Id., at 122.
113. Id., at 121.
114. Id., at 126.

See the famous case, Courtney v. Glanvil, Cro. Jac. 343.

115. Ibid.

116. Id., at 124.

117. USHER, THE RiSe

AND

FALL OF THE HIGH COMMIssiON, 159 (Oxford,

1913).
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and prohibited the ecclesiastical judge from proceeding with the case
on the ground that it contained temporal matters. The common
law judge then gave a hearing on the return of the writ by the
suitor in the ecclesiastical court. If it were determined that the case
included temporal matter, the prohibition stood, and the ecclesiastical
court could proceed no further. If it was decided that there was
nothing of a temporal nature in the case, a writ of Consultation was
issued to the ecclesiastical court, annulling the prohibition.
A few remarks about the nature and jurisdiction of the various
ecclesiastical courts are necessary here. The courts of interest to
18
our history were the ordinary courts of the Diocese, the Peculiar'
9
The
and the Province, and the Court of High Commission."
former were administered by the Ordinaries, that is, the Bishop in
his Diocese, the head of the church in the Peculiar, and the Archbishop in the Province. The jurisdiction of each was limited in area
to the respective Diocese, Peculiar or Province. These courts claimed
cognizance of a cause in two classes of actions :120 first, where any
of the persons concerned were ecclesiastics; and second, where the
matter in dispute was of an ecclesiastical or spiritual nature. As
examples, the spiritual courts claimed jurisdiction over marriage
and divorce, testamentary matters, tithes due the clergy, and the
vague area of correction of sinners. In exercising this jurisdiction,
the church courts were limited by the common law courts. If the
common law court had cognizance of the cause, or if the action contained temporal matter, the common law court would prohibit the
spiritual court from proceeding with it even though it contained
121
matter of spiritual or ecclesiastical nature.
For several reasons, these ordinary ecclesiastical courts were unable to deal with the complex problem of enforcing the heresy laws
introduced by the Reformation. 12 2 The offenses now denominated
heresy were not only offenses against the faith but were treason
against the Crown. Second, these offenses were not heresy at all
under the old church laws. Third, the chief offenders were churchmen; they could hardly be trusted to convict each other of heresy.
For these reasons and others, 2 3 the King gave to a commission the
power to prosecute heresy. At least as early as 1535,124 such a com118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

A church, exempt from the jurisdiction of the Diocese in which it lies.
The origin of the name is discussed at page 439 herein.
POLLOCK & MATrLAND, op. cit. supra note 13, at 105.
USHER, op. cit. supra note 117, at 159.
Id., at 17.
Ibid.

124. Id., at 17 and 18.
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mission was created. Letters Patent were issued to Thomas Cromwell.
In 1549, in the reign of Edward I, the first general commission
was issued, to a group of men consisting of ministers of state, ecclesiastics, and lawyers, both civil and common. 12 5 Very broad
powers were given to enquire as to heretics and to examine for heresy.
In 1557, under Mary, a commission was created, and its Letters
Patent expressly permitted the use of the ex officio method of procedure. 126 The persons prosecuted by this commission were naturally different, since Mary aimed to restore the ecclesiastical supremacy of Rome, but the methods and the substance and form of the
Letters Patent were largely the same.
By the Act of Supremacy,1 2 7 Elizabeth was authorized to issue
Letters Patent to enforce the provisions of that Act against heresy.
Many such Letters were issued, and between 1557 and about 1580,
the Court of High Commission gradually evolved. Contemporary
documents called the body "the commissioners" or "the ecclesiastical
commissioners" before 1570.128 About 1570 the name "the Commission" or "the Commission Ecclesiastical" are found. 129 In 1580,
it is referred to as "the High Commission", and in 1593 as "the
Court of Ecclesiastical Commission".'8 0 Paralleling this change in
the name of the institution was a change in its nature, it gradually
becoming a formal body sitting regularly and claiming a regular
jurisdiction. 131 This history was the basis of one of the disputes
between the common lawyers and the ecclesiastics concerning the
origin and nature of the High Commission. The common lawyers
argued that the High Commission was authorized solely by the Act
of Supremacy, and dated from that Act. The ecclesiastics cited the
long history from Henry VIII, and argued that the Commission was
based on the King's prerogative, and could not be-limited by a court
62
of the common law.'
Most of the cases in which prohibition were issued against the
ordinary ecclesiastical courts involved the tenths or tithes of the
133
produce of the English farms. These were payable to the vicars.
They were originally payable in kind, but with the growth of com125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id., at 20.
Id., at 21.
1 Eliz., cap. 1 (1558) ; 6 Statutes at Large 107.
UsHaR, op. cit. supra note 117, at 35.
Ibid.
Id., at 36.
Id., at 35.
On page 441 herein.

133. LYoN & BLOCK, op. cit. supranote 77, at 171 ff.
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merce and industry and the increased convenience in the use of
money, both the vicars and the parishioners desired a commutation
of the tithes into money payments. A nodus decimendi would be
reached under which a whole village would agree to pay its small
tithes, i. e., those tithes other than of grain, in a set sum of money.
These "small tithes", for cattle and other stock and for produce,
eventually became more important in value than the tithes in grain.
Further, the value of money was constantly falling. Thus, it was
of great concern to the farmers to prove that a modus had been
reached. Conversely, the church wished to return to payment in
kind, or to make a new agreement at the higher price level.
Under the rule of Bancroft as Archbishop of Canterbury, the ecclesiastical courts began to assume that unimpeachable evidence was
necessary to prove a commutation. Proof of an oral agreement was
exceedingly difficult under the rules of the ecclesiastical courts. Thus,
rather than attempt to prove a mnodus in such courts, the farmers
would apply for a prohibition. The common law courts held that
a modus decinendi was a contract, and hence was cognizable only
in a common law court. Then if the vicar sued in a common law
court, the farmer could claim a jury trial and could present his proofs
of a modus to sympathetic ears.
As indicated above, the common law courts were also issuing writs
of prohibition against the High Commission.' 3 4 In 1600, the Bishops
had petitioned Queen Elizabeth concerning the practice of the common law courts in granting prohibitions, and in 1605 articuli cleri
were drawn up by Bancroft and presented to James I on behalf of
the clergy of the realm. The King was asked to determine the
causes over which the ordinary ecclesiastical courts and the High
Commission had cognizance.' 35
There was an important precedent in support of the position of
the Archbishop, in Caudrey's case,13 6 decided in the Queen's Bench
in 1594. Robert Caudrey had been parson of a rectory, and was
removed from this office for preaching against the Book of Common
Prayer. The High Commission had determined that he should be
removed, and the sentence was signed by the Bishop of London as a
member of the Commission, with the consent of two other members
who had sat on the matter. In 1591, Caudrey brought an action of
trespass against the parson appointed by the Bishop to succeed him.
The jury gave a special verdict. They found that the successor
134. On page 436 herein.
135. CAMPB.LL, op. cit. supra note 72, at 270.

136. 5 Co. Rep. i (1591).
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parson had committed a trespass only if the removal of Caudrey
was unlawful. This point was argued before all the judges of the
Queen's Bench.
The judges held that the Act of Supremacy did not alter the usual
ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bishop over members of the clergy
in his Diocese, and that therefore the removal was lawful. According to Coke's report of the case, apparently published in 1605, the
year in which Bancroft drew up his articidi cleri, the judges then
went on to make several important observations about the effect of
the Reformation and the Act of Supremacy on the ecclesiastical
courts. They said that the Act of Supremacy was not introductive
of new law, but declaratory of the old. 13 7 Coke says :138
*

.

. It was resolved by all the Judges, that the King or Queen

of England for the time being may make such an ecclesiastical
commission as is before mentioned, by the ancient prerogative
and law of England . . .
Coke also states that the Judges held that the powers of the King
of England over the body politic, clerical and lay, were plenary.
. . . And as in temporal causes, the King, by the mouth of

the Judges in his courts of Justice doth judge and determine
the same by the temporal laws of England: so in causes ecclesiastical and spiritual . . . (the conusance whereof belongs

not to the common laws of England) the same are to be determined and decided by ecclesiastical Judges, according to the
King's ecclesiastical laws of this realm: . . .
It was now argued by the ecclesiastics that if this were so, then
the ecclesiastical courts and the common law courts were co-equals,
and one of them could not decide the limits of the jurisdiction of the
other. As stated by Archbishop Bancroft, the argument was thus :139
The Authority of Spiritual Courts and Temporal Courts of
Law flowing equally from the Crown, and it being of so great
Importance to the Good of the Community that each be kept
within its proper Bounds, it seems no means agreeable to that
Equality of Origin and Descent, nor a Way in any Degree likely to attain that common End, that the one should be set as a
Judge over the other and prescribe Bounds to it; and take to
itself the cognizance of whatever matters itself shall please.
137. Id., at viii.
138. Ibid.

139. 2 Inst. 19, quoting Bancroft.
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Therefore, the ecclesiastics petitioned the King to assume the role
of defining the respective jurisdictions of his courts. They asked
that he prevent the common law courts from interfering by writs
of prohibition with proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts. The companion question which concerned the Archbishop was whether the
High Commission was a statutory court or one created by virtue
of the King's prerogative.
These issues came to a head in Nicholas Fuller's case,140 in 1607,
but the actual decision in that case was inconclusive. Richard Mansel, a nonconformist minister, and Thomas Ladd, a Yarmouth merchant, had been committed by the Court of High Commission for
their refusals to take the oath ex officio. Ladd had insisted that he
first see a copy of certain answers he had given at a previous questioning, so that he might avoid being charged with perjury. Mansel
insisted that he first see a copy of the charges against him. Nicholas
Fuller had been a prominent common lawyer in the attacks on the
ecclesiastical courts. 141 As counsel for Mansel and Ladd, he applied to the King's Bench for writs of habeas corpus, and argued on
the return of the writs that the High Commission had exceeded its
authority. He submitted that the High Commission was an ecclesiastical court, deriving all its authority from the Act of Supremacy.
This act, Fuller argued, limited the Commission to the powers that
the ecclesiastical courts had possessed prior to its passage, and prior
to the Act of Supremacy ecclesiastical courts had no power to fine
142
and imprison.
Fuller presented his case as a broad attack on the legality of the
High Commission's methods of procedure and sentence. During
argument he referred to the Commission as Popish and anti-Christ,
and as an instrument of supression of true religion. 148 Shortly
afterward, the High Commission arrested Fuller, and charged him
with scandalous statements "to the slander of the Church . . . and

to the malicious impeachment of
ecclesiastical. ' 144 Fuller applied
prohibition.
After many proceedings 145 the
a conference of all the Justices

His Majesty's authority in causes
to the King's Bench for a writ of
case came on for argument before
and Barons of England. At this

140. 12 Co. Rep. 41 (1603).
141. Maguire, supra note 3, at 224.
142. LYoN & BLOCK, op. cit. supra note 78, at 176.

143. Id., at 176, 177.

144. Ibid.
145. Maguire, op. cit. supra note 3, at 225; Coke's report of the case gives
only the legal points decided.
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time, Coke was Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, and
undoubtedly the most influential of the common law judges. The common law judges managed to decide the case in favor of the High
Commission, and thus avoid the certain ire of James J.146 Yet every
point of law was decided in favor of the authority of the common
law courts. The holding was that the High Commission had jurisdiction to try Fuller for "Heresie, Schism and erroneous Opinions," which they immediately proceeded to do on a writ of Consultation-from the court of King's Bench. Fuller was fined and
imprisoned.
The decision of the judges was that the High Commission had
power to try Fuller for heresy. Since the Commission purported to
do no more than this, the question of the power of the Commission
to try him for making slanderous statements about the Commission
in a common law court was avoided by the common law judges. But
the judges gave their opinion :147
"2. That the Construction of the Statute 1 Eliz. cap. 1 [the Act
of Supremacy] and of the Letters Patent of the High Commission in Ecclesiastical Causes founded upon the said Act, belongs
to the Judges of the Common Law: For . . . their Authority
and Power is given to them by Act of Parliament, and Letters
Patent, the Construction of which belong to temporal Judges:
3. It was resolved where there is any Question concerning what
Power or Jurisdiction belongs to Ecclesiastical Judges, in any
particular Case, the Determination of this belongs to the Judges
of the Common Law; . . . And so the Determination of a
Thing, whether it belongs to Court Christian, doth appertain to
the Judges of the Common Law, and the Judges of the Common
Law have Power to grant a Prohibition."
No doubt the Archbishop was well satisfied with the result of
this case, and King James himself wrote Coke and thanked him
profusely for thus settling the differences between the courts of
common law and the High Commission. 148
But Coke had asserted the power of the common law courts to issue the writ of prohibition to restrict the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical
courts. Coke now extended in two directions the rules which he
had laid down in Fullers case. He commenced to issue prohibi146. Id., at 226.
147. 12 Co. Rep. 41, 42.
148. LYON & BLOCK, op. cit. supra note 78, at 178.
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tions against the ecclesiastical courts directed against their methods
of procedure rather than their assertions of jurisdiction. He also
issued prohibitions against the High Commission, where it was intruding not on the jurisdiction of the common law courts, but upon
that of the ordinary ecclesiastical courts. The former was a direct
blow against the oath ex officio. The latter was an indirect blow,
for the ordinary ecclesiastical courts could use the ex officio procedure only in causes matrimonial or testamentary.
Wigmore and Mary Hume Maguire agree that the prohibitions
which Coke issued against the church courts on the ground that their
procedure was illegal dealt the crucial blow to the oath ex officio
and to the High Commission.' 49 Perhaps Coke was led to this
course by his successful argument in Collier v. Collier,' 50 in 1589.
Every lawyer is aware of the persuasiveness to himself of an argument he has successfully urged in litigation. The most detailed report of this case is in Croke, under the name Cullier v. Cullier,'5 1
and reads in its entirety:
"They were sued in the spiritual court for incontinency, and
the Judges there would examine them upon their oath if they
did it. - But because izemo tenetur prodere seipsum in such
cases of defamation, but only in causes testamentary and matrimonial, where no discredit can be to the party by his oath,
Coke prayed a prohibition; and it was granted."
Leonard's report of the case 152 suggests that the result was less
conclusive. It reads in full:
"Between Collier and Collier the Case was, That the Plaintiff was Sued for Incontinence in the Spiritual Court, and there
they would have him answer upon his oath if he ever had Carnal Knowledge of such a Woman; upon which he prayed a
Prohibition: Et neino tenetur seipswm prodere: But the Court
would advise of it."
This case was no doubt brought in one of the courts of the Ordinary, rather than in the Court of High Commission. In the first
place, there is no mention that it was in the High Commission in
any of the extant reports. No reporter would omit tNs significant
fact. Second, no contemporary documents indicate the objection
149. Wirmore, supra note 3, 14 HARV. L. Rev. 622; Maguire, op. cit. supra

note 3, at 221.
150. 4 Leon. 194; Cro. Eliz. 201; Moore 906 (1589).
151. Cro. Eliz. 201.

152. 4 Leon. 194.
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that would surely have arisen from the Commission at that date
if the common law court had made such a decision. Third, the case
was brought by a party, and not on the court's own motion. The
High Commission was developing such an original jurisdiction, but
indications are that it had not yet become a regular practice. 153
Coke's reliance therefore was on the 1315-16 statute Prohibitio for15 4
mata de Statuto Articuli Cleri.
At any rate, in 1607, the same year in which Fuller's case was
decided, the Lords of the Council at Whitehall, on a motion of the
Commons, asked the two Chief Justices of the common law courts,
Coke and Popham, "in what Cases the Ordinary may examine any
15 5 The judges answered :156
person ex officio upon oath."
"1. That the Ordinary cannot constrain any Man Ecclesiastical or Temporal, to swear generally to answer to such Interrogatories as shall be administered unto them; but ought to
deliver to him the Articles upon which he is to be examined,
to the Intent that he may know whether he ought by the Law
to answer to them; . . .
2. No Man Ecclesiastical or Temporal shall be examined
upon secret Thoughts of his Heart, or of his Secret Opinion :
But something ought to be objected against him what he hath
spoken or done; No Lay-men may be examined ex officio, except in two Causes, and that was grounded upon great Reasonfor Lay-men for the most part are not lettered, wherefore theymay easily be inveigled and intrapped, and principally in Heresy,
and Errors of Faith . . .
.. . And the Reason that the Ecclesiastical Judge shall examine them in these two Cases, is for this, that Contracts of
Matrimony, and the Estates of the Dead are many Times Secret; . . ."
Concerning the oath e'x officio, the judges said :157 "for as a.
Civilian said, that this was Inventio Diaboli ad destruendas miserorurn animas ad infernum [The invention of the Devil to destroy
miserable souls in hell]." And quoting from the provisions of a
prohibition in the register of Writs, the judges said that the oath
procedure was' 58 "against the Custom of the Realm, which has been
153. UsHER. op. cit. supra note 117, at 95-101.
154. Edw. II (date uncertain); 2 Statutes at Large 416.
page 424 herein.
155. 12 Co. Rep. 26 (1607).
156. Id., at 26.
157. Ibid.
158. Id., at 27.
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Following this doctrine, the common law courts continued to use
the writ of prohibition to limit the ecclesiastical courts. Bancroft
again urged, as he had in his Articuli Cleri of 1605, that where a
jurisdictional dispute arose between common law and ecclesiastical
courts, the King himself should decide. 159 The King ordered that
the matter should be argued before him, personally. In Prohibitions del Roy, 160 a classic document in English constitutional history,
Coke relates the proceedings that then took place. He tells us :161
".. . And the Archbishop said, that this was clear in Divinity,
that such Authority, belongs to the King, by the Word of God
in the Scripture. To which it was answered by me, in the
Presence, and with the clear Consent of all the justices of England, and Barons of the Exchequer, that the King in his own
person cannot adjudge any case, either criminal . . .or betwixt
Party and Party . . . but this ought to be determined and ad-

judged in some Court of Justice, according to the Law and Custom of England . . . no Man shall be put to answer without

Presentment before the Justices, Matter of Record, or by Due
Process, or by Writ Original, according to the Ancient Law of
the Land: . . . then the King said, that he thought the Law

was founded upon Reason, and that be and others had Reason,
as well as the Judges; To which it was answered by me, that
true it was, that God had endowed his Majesty with excellent
Science, and great Endowments of Nature, but his Majesty was
not learned in the Laws of his Realm of England, and Causes
which concern the Life, or Inheritance or Goods, or Fortunes
of his Subjects, they are not to be decided by natural Reason,
but by the artificial Reason and Judgment of Law, which Law
is an Act which requires long study and Experience, before
That a Man can attain to the Cognizance of it; and that the
Law was the Golden Met-wand and Measure to try the Causes
of the Subjects; and which protected his Majesty in Safety
and Peace: With which the King was greatly offended, and
said, that then he should be under the Law, which was Treason
to affirm, as he said; to which I said, that Bracton saith, Quod
Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed Deo & Lege [that the
King is not under any man, but under God and the Law] ."
159. 12 Co. Rep. 63.
160. Ibid.
161. Id., at 63 to 65.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol8/iss4/2

30

1956]

Randall: Sir Edward Coke and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMIINATION

Coke's account of these proceedings may be somewhat more favorable to himself than the facts warrant. 162 A contemporary letter
indicates that James severely rebuked him for his boldness.' 63 Nonetheless, the incident was of extreme importance, for the events of
that day were undoubtedly related throughout London, since the
issues involved were of great import to common and ecclesiastical
lawyers and to the public.
Despite the King's displeasure, Coke continued to extend the rules
he had laid down in Fuller's case. As indicated above, 164 he extended the doctrine of that case, first to restrict the methods of
procedure in ecclesiastical courts. In Allan Ball's case,165 in 1609,
he asserted the power of common law courts to restrict the methods
of procedure in the High Commission. Speaking for the court en
banc, he held that the Commission could not send a Pursuivant, an
attendant of the court, to arrest a person subject to its jurisdiction.
The High Commission claimed power from the Act of Supremacy
and the Letters Patent to do so. Coke ruled that they must proceed
by citation, according to old ecclesiastical law. "For the statute 1
El. [the Act of Supremacy] did not give them any such Authority
to arrest the Body of any subject upon Surmise; . . ."

Coke also

said that such an arrest by a pursuivant would be tortious, and hence
that if the prisoner resisted and killed the pursuivant, it would not
be murder. The decision in the case Coke put on the broadest
grounds, carefully specifying the procedure which the High Commission must follow, and stating :166

"[they must not] arrest him by a Pursuivant before any Answer or Default made; and this will be against the statute of
Magna Charta, and all the Ancient Statutes . .."
The decision must really have rankled the Archbishop. Here were
cases over which the common law courts admittedly had no jurisdiction. Likewise, it was admitted that the ecclesiastical courts did have
jurisdiction. Yet, the common law courts were testing the legality
of the ecclesiastical proceedings by common law standards.
The second way in which Coke extended the writ of prohibition
was to employ it to forbid the High Commission to proceed in any
cause within the jurisdiction of the ordinary ecclesiastical courts. One
162. Usher, 18 English Historical Review 664.
163. Quoted in CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 72, at 272; quoting from
LODGE'S ILLUSTRATIONs, iii, 564.

164. At nage 443 herein.
165. 12 Co. Rep. 49 (1609).
166. Id., at 49.
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such case reported by Coke is Marmaduke Langdales case.16 7 He
held that a suit by Langdale's wife in the High Commission for
maintenance and support could be prohibited, because the action belonged to the Court of the Ordinary. One technical objection to
the issuance of a writ of prohibition, which Coke summarily dismissed, was that the Court of Common Pleas had no jurisdiction
to issue a prohibition because a husband could not sue his wife in
168
a common law court.
Another interesting case was Edward's case,169 also in 1609. The
High Commission had proceeded against Edwards for divers scandalous remarks disgracing the reputation of one Dr. Walton as a
doctor and as an Oxford graduate. The prohibition was granted
by Coke on two grounds: that the matter and persons involved
were temporal; and that, if the action were founded on defamation,
it should be tried before the Ordinary. To assign the cause to the
Ordinary instead of to the High Commission was an effective method of assuring that the inquisitional method would not be used.
The High Commission claimed the right to use the oath only because
its Letters Patent were based on the Royal prerogative. Thus it
argued that the provisions of the ProIibitio Formata were not applicable to its proceedings. But the common law courts could issue
prohibitions against the ordinary ecclesiastical courts to prevent their
use of the oath, without calling into question the King's prerogative.
Coke next extremely offended the King on a question even nearer
to the Royal prerogative than the prohibitions. In 1610, he was
sent for to attend the King's Council, which included the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Treasurer, the Lord Privy Seal, and the Chancellor
of the Dutchy. Also present were the Attorney General, the Solicitor and the Recorder. At this time, the Solicitor was the now
fast rising Francis Bacon. Coke was asked for an advisory opinion
upholding the right of the King, under his prerogative, to issue a
Proclamation prohibiting the use of wheat to make starch, and another Proclamation forbidding any new construction around the city
of London. The advisory opinion was necessary to answer a complaint which James had received from the Commons concerning his
frequent assertion of his prerogative through the issuance of proclamations. These questions had been referred to the King as Grievances, and the address of the Commons to the King had been read
167. 12 Co. Rep. 58 (1609).

168. Ibid.
169. 13 Co. Rep. 9 (1609).
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by Sir Francis Bacon. 170 Although Bacon was high in the King's
favor at this time, and although the address was most carefully
worded, the King at once recognized that his prerogative was challenged. The King had answered the Commons that he would confer
with his Privy Council and with his judges, and do what was right.
Now he clearly expected the Chief Justice of his Court of Common
Pleas to give an opinion supporting his claim.
Under the heading Proclamations in his Reports, 17 1 Coke relates
his version of what occurred. Except for Coke himself, "all concluded that it should be necessary at that time to confirm the King's
prerogative ... 172 He asked time to confer with the other judges,
since he knew no precedent to support the claim. To the argument of the Lord Chancellor that every precedent had first a commencement, Coke answered that there was need of great consideration "to provide that this be not against the Law of the Land:..."173
Time to consider the cases was permitted. Coke conferred with
Popham, then Chief Judge of the King's Bench, and with the Chief
Baron and Baron Altham of the Court of Exchequer. The conclusion of the judges was unequivocal and was a strong assertion of
the supremacy of the law :174
". .. that the King by his Proclamation cannot create any
offense which was not an offense before, for then he may alter
the Law of the Land by his Proclamation in a high Point; for
if he may create an Offense where none is, upon that ensues
Fine and Imprisonment; Also the Law of England is divided
into three Parts, Common Law, Statute Law, and Custom; but
the King's Proclamation is none of them: . . .
Also it was resolved, that the King hath no Prerogative,
but that which the Law of the Land allows him."
Sir Francis Bacon at this time conceived the idea that the promotion of Coke to the position of Chief Justice of the King's Bench
would advance the interests both of James I and of Bacon himself.
Bacon expected thereby to become Attorney General. He therefore
presented to the King the suggestion that the promotion of Coke
would render him "obsequious" because Coke would then think himself near a place on the Privy Council. 175 Bacon also argued that
170. SPEDDIxG, LIVE AND Lmrms OF SIR FRANCIS BACON, iv., 202.

1869).

(London,

171. 12 Co. Rep. 74 (1610).

172. Ibid.

173. Id., at 75.
174. Id., at 76.
175.

SPEDDING,

op. cit. supra note 170, at 381.
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the promotion would "be thought abroad a kind of discipline to him
for opposing himself to the King's causes",176 and thus would have
a salutary effect upon other judges. The position of Chief Justice
of the King's Bench was far less profitable than the comparable
post in the Common Pleas.
The King agreed to the proposal, and in November, 1613, Coke
sat on the King's Bench. Coke was also raised to the Privy Council, and Bacon's ambition to be Attorney General was gratified. But
Bacon proved far from being an accurate judge of Coke's character
in his predictions to the King. Coke resisted the claims of the King's
prerogative as effectively from his new post as he had from his old.
Coke came to the King's Bench in time to hear argument in the
cases of John Burrowes, Will. Cax, Dyton and others v. The High
177
COmm1111tsSiolt,
also called Dighton v. Holt. This case, decided
finally in 1616, brought the legality of the use of the oath ex officio by
the High Commission again in question. The defendants brought
habeas corpus for their release from detention by the High Commission for their refusal to take the oath. On the return of the writ,
counsel for the relators, Serjeant Finch, argued that the return was
bad, because the commitment was for their refusal to take the oath.
They could not be forced to answer interrogatories on matters concerning penal laws, "whereas they ought not to be compelled to answer upon oath, and thereby to accuse themselves. 17 8 Finch showed
that in the return there were questions which might be directly incriminating, such as the question, "Whether he had stolen a surplice
out of the Church, or not."1 79 Coke said that it was clear that by
the 1401 statute of Henry IV18 0 that laymen could be examined
upon their oath, but this was repealed by the statute of Henry VIII,
in 1533.181 After the latter statute, said Coke, laymen could not
be examined on their oath, except in matters matrimonial or testamentary.
Both Finch and Coke cited the cases from the reign of 'Queen
Elizabeth182 in which the common law courts had granted petitions
of habeascorpus to release defendants from the ordinary ecclesiastical
courts. These cases Coke showed involved the use of the oath ex
officio to question laymen concerning ecclesiastical offenses. The
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id., at 382.
3 Bulstrode 48 (1616).
Id., at 49.
Ibid.

180. Discussed on page 425 herein.
181. Discussed on page 426 herein.
182. Hinde's case, Dyer 175b; Skroggcs v. Colesiill, Dyer 175a; Leigh's case,

18 Eliz.
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court and counsel seemed to agree that the cases applied here, but

the petition was not granted. The case was twice adjourned, and
then Coke conferred with the members of the High Commission,
while the defendants remained in prison.
After some nine months, the case was moved again.' 88 Coke
found that the procedure of the High Commission was illegal for
two reasons. First the defendants were charged with reforming
the Book of Common Prayer, and this would be an offense against
the Act of Uniformity of Common Prayer, 8 4 passed in the first
year of Elizabeth. This was a penal statute, and the party could
not be examined upon his oath concerning violations of it. Second,
the party must be presented with a copy of the Articles, to allow
the party to determine whether the matter was within the jurisdiction of the High Commission and to prepare his answers. Thereupon, Coke ordered the release of the prisoners on bail, until the
next term of court, the prisoners to conform themselves to the Act
of Uniformity in the meantime.18 5
Upon the next hearing of the case, the prisoners were asked
whether they would conform themselves, according to the Law of
the Church. They refused to answer to the satisfaction of the court,
and were then committed again to the custody of the High Commission. As in Fuller's case, the defendants won their arguments on
the law but lost the case. Coke exlains the case as follows :186
"..

. The reason, upon the first return of our Opinions, for

their delivery, was, because they were committed, upon the
Statute of 1 Eliz. [the Act of Uniformity] for refusing to answer upon Oath . . . ; but it is not so here now, this being for
heresy, . . . and they have as good power and authority, to

commit for such causes, as any Court hath."
Despite the fact that the court upheld the High Commission, the
decision of Coke that the Commission could not use the oath ex
officio except in causes matrimonial or testamentary prevailed. No
further cases arise in which suitors appealed to the common law
courts to restrain the ecclesiastical courts in their use of this procedure. This is due in some measure to the fact that in 1610, Archbishop Bancroft had died and been succeeded by the milder and more
reasonable Archbishop Abbot.' 8 7 Under Abbot, the ecclesiastical
183. 3 Bulstrode, 50.
184. 1 Eliz., cap. 1 (1558) ; 6 Statutes at Large 207.
185. 3 Bulstrode, 50.

186. Id., at 55.

187. Sm
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courts acquiesced in the rulings made by Coke in the various hearings of the Burrowes case. Thus successfully ended the struggle of
the common lawyers against the oath as employed by the church
courts.
Coke was not yet finished in his struggle against the extreme
assertion of the King's prerogative, however. In the great case of
Comnmendams,188 Coke again alienated the King. An action of
Quare linpedit had been brought by Colt and Glover against the
Bishop of Coventry. Plaintiffs claimed the right to appoint a cleric
to a certain church, basing the claim upon a grant. The Bishop
defended on the ground that he had been appointed in Commendam l8 9 by the King. At the trial of the case in the Exchequer,
before all the common law judges, counsel for the plaintiff argued
that the King had no power to grant an ecclesiastical preferment.
The Bishop of Winchester had expressly attended court to see that
no such argument was permitted by the common law judges, since
the King's prerogative was concerned.
When Winchester informed the IKing, the latter was advised by
Sir Francis Bacon that a writ of de non prosequendo rege inconsulto
might be issued by the Chancellor to the common law judges, halting
all proceedings until the court consulted with the King.190 This
writ could issue if a case concerned the King's prerogative. Since
the action was a civil proceeding between private parties, however,
it was not clear that the writ would be honored, and the King instead
had Bacon write Coke saying that the King's pleasure was that
the action be stayed.
Colce persuaded the common law judges to hear and decide the
case, and judgment was given for the plaintiff. Coke and the other
judges then sent an explanatory letter to the Iing, but James was
not satisfied. Coke then summoned all the judges to appear before
the ICing and ask his pardon. Thereupon, after discussion, the King
thought the judges were humbled, and put to them the question :191
"In a case where the King believes his prerogative or interest
concerned, and requires the Judges to attend him for their advice, ought they not to stay the proceedings till his Majesty has
consulted them?"
All the judges except Coke answered in the affirmative. The
Chief Justice of England said :192
188. Hobart, 197.
189. Id., at 199.
190. CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 72, at 285, 286.
191. Id., at 285, 286.
192. Id., at 286.
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"When the case happens, I shall do that which shall be fit for
a judge to do."
The King dismissed the judges with the remark, that the judges
should keep the limits of their several courts, and not suffer his
prerogative to be wounded. 193 He was not so bold as to punish
Coke at this time. However, Coke's career as a judge was now in
great jeopardy. He further aggravated the King by his insistence
that the dispensing of patronage posts in the King's Bench was a
right of the Chief Justice, and rejected the King's candidate for
chief clerk. On November 16, 1616, Coke was removed from the
bench, on the frivolous charge of having committed a breach of his
duty while he was Attorney General many years previous. 1 94

So

at the age of sixty-six, Coke seemed to retire into obscurity, only
to emerge more triumphant than ever some years later, when he
made an important contribution to winning from the King the Petition of Right.
But so far as our history is concerned, the work of Coke was completed. It was now firmly established that the common law courts
could through the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus prevent
the ecclesiastical courts, including the High Commission, from using
the oath ex officio as a method of questioning suspects. The task
of extending these decisions of Coke to proceedings in the common
law courts remained. When the Parliament on the petition of John
Lilburn voted that the action of the Star Chamber in punishing
Lilburn for refusing to take the oath was "illegal and against the
liberty of the subject," the privilege was established as a part of
the common law. 19 5 The Puritans and other settlers brought the
doctrine to the colonies, and in 1791 it became enshrined in the
fundamental law of the new Republic.' 96

193. Ibid.
194. Id., at 287 ff.
195. 3 How. S.T. 137 (1637) ; GRIswoLD, supra note 1, pp. 3 to 7.

196. U. S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment, see footnote 1; Pittman, The

Colonial and ConstitutionalHistory of the Prizilege Against Self-Incrimination
in America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763 (1935).
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